"There’s even some evidence that [al-Maliki] wants to start a fight with the Sons of Iraq," said Kahl. "Al-Maliki doesn’t believe he has to accommodate these people. He will only do it if we twist his arm to the breaking point."

Kahl said al-Maliki has made a series of moves that have consolidated his personal power position within the state apparatus as well as in relation to various armed groups in the country. He has put intelligence agencies directly under his control and has set up major military operation centres around the country which report directly to the prime minister’s office.

You might recall that the "Sons of Iraq" or the "Awakening Councils" or whatever name you choose to use are the Sunni tribal leaders and militias we have been paying off to "pacify" the formerly deadly areas for US troops in the Sunni triangle. They represent one of the the real reasons for the decrease in violence in the country, and the so-called success of the "Surge" strategy which Bush and McCain keep touting. The trouble is, al-Maliki, being a Shi'ite political boss, doesn't trust any of the Sunnis and is unlikely to want to share power or the revenues from oil Iraq's oil resources with them, whether American troops stay in iraq or not. Yet their continued participation as a vital element of the US military's counterinsurgency strategy is essential.

Oh what a fine mess we get ourselves in when first we practice lying to the American people and press about how great things are in Iraq. Because, under the surface the same old tribal, ethnic and sectarian rivalries still exist, just waiting to re-erupt at an opportune moment. Maliki obviously sees this as the best time to consolidate his own power and get rid of the Americans who stand in the way of his waging war against the Sunni Sons of Iraq. And that wouldn't go over well with the Bush/McCain/Rove plan for US and Iraqi politics this year.

Because the truth about Iraq and the "Surge" isn't exactly what General petraeus and the Bush administration has been telling us, is it?

Petraeus and the U.S. military command in Iraq have asserted that al-Sadr’s decisions reflected the fact that the Mahdi Army had been weakened by U.S. military pressures. However, the broader set of developments over the past year suggests that the primary reason for Sadr’s willingness to give up military resistance was a strategic understanding with Iran to shift to political and diplomatic resistance to the U.S. military presence.

High officials in the al-Maliki regime asserted repeatedly last fall that it was Iran’s intervention with al-Sadr that brought about the unilateral ceasefire of Aug. 27, 2007. Sadr’s decisions to give up military control of Basra and Sadr City before his forces were defeated were taken in the context of Iranian mediation between al-Sadr and the al-Maliki regime.

Iran’s strategic relationship with al-Sadr accomplished what the U.S. military never believed would be possible even in its most optimistic scenario -- the neutralisation of the most potent political-military threat to the regime’s stability. The ability of Iran to deliver that benefit to al-Maliki -- as part of a broader shift to an anti-occupation regime policy -- almost certainly strengthened the case that Iran made to al-Maliki for a demand for a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal in the status of forces negotiations.

And a more powerful al-Maliki backed by Iran is the last thing Petraeus and Bush and McCain want right now, despite the need to re-focus our attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan and other issues, like Eastern Europe and the threat to the former Russian Republics:

Despite the change in the power situation, [Colin Kahl, a fellow at the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) -- which has supported a long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq] and CNAS still takes the position that Iraq needs long-term U.S. support so badly that the Bush administration should use its leverage to get the al-Maliki regime to make the political accommodations necessary to achieve longer-term stability in the country. For example, the Iraq government’s need for U.S. help in recovering illegally exported funds and properties, which were included in the statement of principles governing the negotiations last November at Iraqi insistence.

Then there is the threat of immediate troop withdrawal if al-Maliki does not toe the line. Kahl said he was told in Iraq that, in one of the regular videoconferences Bush holds with al-Maliki, he said, "If the negotiations crash and burn, I will be forced to pull out all U.S. troops by Jan. 1."

Does anyone really believe Bush would pull all US troops out of Iraq by January1, 2009 if he doesn't get his way? Does anyone believe Maliki believes that threat/bluff by Bush?

I think you know the answer to those two questions as well as I do. Bush is an old (if incompetent) oil man. He ain't leaving Iraq until we pull the Presidency from his cold, politically dead hands. And if we know that, so does Prime Minister Maliki. In fact, I have to agree with the conclusion reached by Gareth Parter in his article, because, for one thing it simply makes sense and reflects the reality of Iraq's situation (something which has never been a Bush administration strong point regarding the Middle East, much less Iraq's place in it).

The al-Maliki regime is a Shiite-dominated government that views its Sunni Arab neighbours -- who have generally opposed Shiite rule in Iraq -- with intense distrust and looks to Iran for support against them. The Bush administration, on the other hand, has forged closer relations with Sunni regimes against Iran. The short-term Shiite dependence on the U.S. occupation to establish Shiite control of the state apparatus is giving way to a more fundamental distrust toward U.S. power in Iraq and the region.